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Product Liability, Research and Development,
and Innovation

W. KipViscusi and Michael J. Moore
Duke University

Product liability ideally should promote efficient levels of product
safety, but misdirected liabilityefforts may depress beneficialinnovations. This paper examines these competing effects of liability
costs on product R & D intensity and new product introductionsby
manufacturingfirms. At low to moderate levels of expected liability
costs, there is a positiveeffect of liabilitycosts on productinnovation.
At very high levels of liability costs, the effect is negative. At the
sample mean, liabilitycosts increase R & D intensity by 15 percent.
The greater linkage of these effects to product R & D rather than
process R & D is consistent with the increased prominence of the
design defect doctrine.

I.

Introduction

Management decisions with respect to the product mix are subject to
a variety of uncertainties. One class of these uncertainties pertains to
the regulatory environment of the firm, including incentives generated by direct government
regulation and civil liability. Defective
products may generate enormous
legal liabilities, potentially undermining not only the profitability of the product but possibly the
firm itself. In this paper, we explore the role of the product liability
system in affecting new product development decisions.
In recent years, widespread attention has been devoted to the liabilHelpful comments were provided by George J. Stigler, an anonymous referee, and
participants in seminars at the National Bureau of Economic Research Industrial Organization Workshop, the Brookings Institution Conference on Civil Liability, and the
Law and Economic Workshop at the University of Michigan. David Anderson provided
excellent research assistance. This research was supported by the National Science
Foundation (grant SES-8823002).
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ity crisis.1 Product liability litigation increased dramatically, with the
number of product liability cases alleging personal injury filed in the
federal courts rising from 2,393 in 1975 to 13,408 in 1989. Liability
insurance costs also escalated, as general liability insurance premiums
increased sixfold from 1975 to 1988.
Several changes in liability doctrines over the past three decades
contributed to this growth. First, most jurisdictions adopted strict
liability, which expands the range of situations in which the producer
can be found liable. Courts now view producers as serving, in part,
as product risk insurers. Second, the courts greatly expanded the
doctrine of design defects and the role of hazard warnings. Whereas
product liability cases formerly focused on manufacturing defects, a
firm could now be found liable for a broad range of design defects.
By doing so, the courts in effect took on functions similar to those of
product risk regulatory agencies. Third, the emergence of mass toxic
torts generated litigation on an unprecedented scale. There are over
100,000 claimants each in the lines of litigation involving asbestos,
Agent Orange, and the Dalkon Shield.
The increased emphasis on design defects altered the industrial
incidence of product liability costs. "Manufacturing defect" cases concentrated liability among older firms that manufactured their products in a negligent manner, perhaps because of outmoded technologies or inadequate quality control. In contrast, design defect cases
affect all segments of the market. The least innovative firms incur
liability costs because their products do not reflect the industry's state
of the art in safety. Highly innovative firms that introduce new product designs with uncertain safety implications run substantial liability
risks as well.
High expected product liability costs may depress innovation. The
Monsanto Company decided not to market its already patented phosphate fiber asbestos substitute because Monsanto "was not prepared
to accept the potential product liability risks associated with marketing the reinforcing fiber, no matter how safe it may be" (Business
Insurance, July 20, 1989, p. 3). Similarly, a National Academy of Sciences (1990) panel concluded that U.S. pharmaceutical firms terminated research on contraceptive products in part because the liability
risks were too great. The market for vaccines has also been hard
hit, as rising liability costs decreased the number of firms producing
vaccines for five serious childhood diseases from 13 to three during
the 1980s.2 U.S. private aircraft production plummeted over the same
1 The subsequent paragraphs draw on a variety of material pertaining to the dimension of the liability crisis. See Viscusi (1991 a, 1991b) for documentation.
2 See Viscusi (1990, 199 1a). Kitch (1985) provides a detailed perspective on how
liability has affected a variety of specific vaccines.
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period, with many industry officials citing rising liability costs as a
major contributing factor.
To move beyond these anecdotes and case studies, our empirical
approach considers the relationship between product liability insurance costs and various aspects of innovation using a large data set on
firm behavior. The time period we consider, 1980-84, follows by two
decades the emergence of the design defect doctrine and the initial
period of adoption of strict liability. As a result, the liability regime
reflected in the data should fully capture the behavior influenced by
the central doctrines in modern product liability law.
Supporters of the current liability regime claim that liability costs
provide incentives for introducing safer products and eliminating
unsafe products. Liability critics suggest that the cost increases discourage innovation more generally. Although we can ascertain the
nature of product research and development decisions most strongly
influenced by liability costs, the efficiency properties of these results
are less clear. Full resolution of the debate on efficiency requires a
product-specific assessment of the risks and benefits of different designs. Some products may not provide an efficient level of safety and
should be either redesigned or perhaps not marketed at all. In a
perfectly competitive market, fully informed consumers will purchase
only products that provide an efficient level of product safety. If,
however, substantial impediments prevent efficient operation, such
as systematic misperception of accident risks or substantial consumer
search costs, market outcomes will not be optimal.
Tort liability can potentially foster greater efficiency in these contexts, particularly since the negligence doctrine and the risk-utility
test for strict liability are analogous to benefit-cost tests for product
safety.3 However, the strict liability test imposes additional obligations
that require the producer to insure the victim's losses, so that the
standard may be binding even when the firm's level of precaution is
efficient.4 Moreover, some legal scholars raise the fundamental issue
of whether juries are qualified to assess the economic merits of alternative product designs. These ambiguities make it difficult to ascribe
efficiency properties to the product liability-innovation linkage. Our
primary emphasis will be on documenting the effects of product liability rather than on drawing specific conclusions regarding their economic efficiency.
The analysis focuses on product R & D intensity as the measure of
3Much of the work of Landes and Posner (1987) and Shavell (1987) deals with the
efficiency properties of many legal rules in this area.
4 Viscusi
(1991b) explores in greater detail the inadequacies of the risk-utility test
from an efficiency standpoint and proposes a reformulation of that test based on an
efficiency-oriented approach.
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innovative activity and on two different measures of product liability
costs. Most noteworthy is the robustness of the findings across the
different dimensions of the product liability-innovation linkage. For
the majority of business units in our sample, product liability increases product R & D intensity. This result lends support to the claim
that higher liability burdens provide incentives for product safety
improvements. There is, however, a nonlinearity in the product liability-innovation relationship. At high levels of liability costs, liability
reduces innovative activity. In the third general empirical result,
more pronounced effects for product innovation relative to process
innovation reflect the increasingly prominent role of the design defect doctrine.
II.

Conceptual Framework

Product liability enters most economic models by simply raising the
expected costs associated with product risks. Liability costs play a
limited role in models based on risk-neutral consumers acting on
perfect information, actuarially fair liability insurance, competitive
product markets with horizontal supply curves, and losses that are
monetary equivalents.5
These conditions are seldom satisfied. Consumer information is
not always perfect. Moreover, since health effects often involve losses
that alter the structure of utility functions, consumers will value product safety even with full coverage of their financial losses. Product
liability cost increases consequently increase the firm's costs and influence its risk-related decisions.
To assess the role of product liability costs, we structure the model
in terms of the firm's unit profit function Ir, thus focusing on safety
and innovation decisions rather than on quantity choice.6 The joint
products of the firm constitute the choice variables and consist of the
level of product safety s and the degree of product novelty z. The
level of safety equals one minus the probability of injury.
A nonlinear hedonic price function consisting of a base product
price p, a premium ctz for product novelty, and a liability cost f3(s,L)
describes the unit price of the product. Consumers will pay more for
product novelty (i.e., et > 0), and we define the scale of the novelty

5See Spence (1977) for exposition of such a model. See also Oi (1973, 1974), Goldberg (1974), and Epple and Raviv (1978).
6This simplification follows Spence (1977). Expansion of the model to include a
quantity choice is straightforward and yields predictable results: higher liability costs
reduce output. However, addition of this consideration complicates the comparative
static results by adding a third equation to the system.
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variable z with no loss of generality so that the novelty price premium
is a simple linear function of (x and z.
The unit liability cost f3(s,L) decreases with product safety (ifs < 0)
and increases with the stringency of the liability regime (AL > 0). In
an absolute liability regime, where firms pay all expected injury costs,
a linear formulation in which f3(s, L) = (1 - s)L is appropriate. In
practice, various liability rules may make the liability cost function a
nonlinear function of the level of safety s. Under a negligence standard, no liability exists unless the firm fails to provide a reasonable
degree of safety, after which the firm becomes liable for all injury
costs (see, e.g., Landes and Posner 1987; Shavell 1987; Polinsky
1989). Even under strict liability, liability on the part of the firm arises
only when the product fails a risk-utility test, which entails a balancing
of the costs and benefits of greater product safety.7 Finally, firms
that market risky products potentially subject themselves to punitive
damages if they have been particularly remiss in providing for product safety. Another complication is that for very high levels of safety
P(s, L) may equal zero.
The inputs necessary to produce safety s and product novelty z are
given by g(s, z). The input requirements increase at an increasing
rate with the value of each joint product (i.e., gs > 0, gZ> 0, go > 0,
and gz, > 0). The unit cost of the inputs is r.
The firm selects the joint products s and z that maximize unit
profits, or
maxw

=

p + oaz- 1(s,L)

-

rg(s,z),

s,z

leading to the first-order condition
gs

-is

(1)

Figure 1 sketches the nature of the firm's problem. Suppose that
the transformation curve go = g(s, z) describes the joint product mix
for the firm at various possible profit-maximizing levels of safety and
novelty. The unit price curve Ro is tangent to this transformation
curve at the optimal product mix, with the slopes of the transformation curve and the unit price curve given by equation (1).8 For simplic7One factor in a risk-utility test is the producer's role as insurer. If this factor is
dominant, the risk-utility test becomes an absolute liability standard.
8 The equation for the constant unit price curve is given by Po = p + az - P(s, L),
or

Po P
so that dzlds = Ala < 0.

+ (sL)
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of the optimal joint product mix

ity, this diagram illustrates the case in which the expected liability cost
is a linear function of the level of risk.
With a very stringent liability regime (i.e., a large value of L), the
unit price curve becomes very steep, taking a form such as R1. This
situation illustrates a corner solution at which the firm undertakes
no product innovation expenditures and undertakes the maximum
amount of safety expenditures on the transformation curve go.9 High
levels of liability consequently may eliminate all innovation and lead
firms to adopt designs without liability costs. Product engineers, for
example, frequently note a bias toward accepted but somewhat risky
designs rather than designs whose safety level is uncertain relative to
the status quo. The observed effect may be withdrawal of the product
altogether, as in the case of intrauterine contraceptive devices and
some vaccines. These corner solutions play an important role in the
empirical analysis.
For interior solutions, the effects of liability cost L on the choice
variables are given by
9 It may be that with such a low market value of safety the pertinent product transformation curve at the profit-maximizing point will be at a safety level of 1.0 rather than
go in fig. 1.
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ds
dL

rg.j3 L

(2)

D

and
dz
dL

- rgs3L

(3)

D,

where the determinant D = (rg,,)2 - rgz(,3 + rg,,) < 0 at an interior
maximum.
The directions of these effects will be apparent if we impose some
additional structure. Suppose that 13sL < 0, as is the case with the
linear liability cost term, 13(s,L) = (1 - s)L. Higher liability costs
will necessarily raise product safety so that dsldL > 0. The product
innovation effect depends on the effect of innovation on the firm's
ability to produce safety. If innovation enables the firm to increase
safety at less cost (i.e., g,, < 0), then dz/dL > 0. If, however, innovation
makes it more difficult for the firm to produce product safety (i.e.,
g" > 0), then dz/dL < 0. If there is no interaction between safety and
novelty in the input requirement function (e.g., g(s, z) = f(s) + h(z)),
then g,. = 0 and dz/dL = 0; higher liability costs will affect safety
investments but not product novelty. There has also been speculation
that juries may be biased against innovative products, controlling for
the level of safety and other factors. Such an anti-innovation bias will
tend to decrease the incentive to innovate at higher levels of liability
cost.10
These various results illustrate the mixed nature of the product
liability-innovation linkage. Higher liability costs will increase product innovations directly related to safety improvements and also those
that introduce new technologies if these technologies decrease the
costs of providing safety. However, innovations that do not lower the
marginal costs of providing safety will be depressed. In the case of
extreme liability costs, product novelty will be eliminated altogether
as the firm selects the no-risk corner solution.
The different components of the innovation process-safety innovations and product novelty-may consequently respond differently
to increasing liability costs. If we could isolate these components empirically, it would be possible to distinguish the competing effects.
Unfortunately, we observe only overall product R & D expenditures,
or total product introductions. The available data do not indicate, for
example, whether the new products represent safer variants of existing product designs or new product designs that alter attributes
10This variation can be readily incorporated into the model by amending the liability
cost term to be f3(s,L, z), where 3z> 0. Equation (1) becomes gj/gz = - sl(u- V)
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other than safety. Our empirical predictions consequently will be
made in terms of the composite of innovative actions.
It should also be emphasized that no value judgments can or should
be attached to whatever liability-innovation linkage we identify. Efficiency judgments regarding these outcomes depend on the character
of the market failure and the nature of the liability regime-issues
that have been explored in detail elsewhere."
III.

The Sample and the Variables

We draw the data on firm-level decisions used in this study from two
primary sources: one pertaining to product decisions and the other
to insurance costs. We link these data on the basis of the pertinent
three-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code.
Product Innovation Data
The product characteristics data consist of a broad panel of U.S.
firms' business units known as the Profit Impact of Marketing Strategies (PIMS) data. These data, developed by the Strategic Planning
Institute, contain both balance sheet and income statement items for
sample lines of business. In addition to these data, the PIMS sample
includes information on characteristics of the business unit's industry
and a wealth of information on the strategies followed by the respondent firms. The PIMS data have been used by Ravenscraft and
Scherer (1982) to study R & D and by Clark and Griliches (1984),
who focused on R & D and productivity growth. Since the PIMS
sample consists primarily of large business units, any inferences
drawn from the subsequent results can be made conditional on relatively large size.
The variables drawn from the PIMS data, which table 1 defines,
include the R & D and innovation variables and dummy indicators
of recent entry or exit by a major competitor. We also considered a
measure of the industry long-run growth rate and line of business
market share, but neither of these had any effect on R & D intensity.
To control for broad industrywide effects, all estimating equations
also include dummy variables indicating whether the line of business
manufactures consumer or producer durables or nondurables. Time
dummy variables for four of the years in the 1980-84 period control
for year-specific cyclical effects.
The unit of observation is the line of business, which PIMS defines
1"See esp. Oi (1973, 1974), Spence (1977), and Epple and Raviv (1978). See also
Landes and Posner (1987), Shavell (1987), Polinsky (1989), and Viscusi (1991b).
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as an operating unit that sells a distinct set of products or services to
an identifiable set of customers, in competition with a well-defined
set of competitors. The primary dependent variable in the empirical
analysis, drawn from the PIMS data, measures dollars spent on product R & D relative to sales, or product R & D intensity. Other innovation variables include process R & D intensity, a measure of the percentage of sales due to new products (i.e., those less than 3 years old),
and a dummy indicator of whether the line of business does any
R & D.
Three dummy variables measure the long-run level of R & D activity for each line of business. The first two of these long-run variables
indicate whether the firm benefits substantially from patents on products or processes. These variables measure long-run R & D capital
at the firm level. The third long-run variable indicates the pace of
technological change in the industry. The results in Levin et al. (1987)
indicate that this latter variable is a better measure of long-run innovative activity.
Product Liability Cost Measures
The product liability insurance cost measures are drawn from the
complete rate-making files of the Insurance Services Office (ISO), an
industry consortium for pooling insurance information. The information utilized pertains to product liability coverage purchased by
firms for the years 1980-84. Consumers do not pay for this coverage
except insofar as the cost is embodied in the product price. This
rate-making data base contains over 200,000 records, where the unit
of observation is the particular product liability insurance policy that
has been written.12 Using the product categorizations (which parallel
the SIC industry codes), we aggregated the information by industry
group to establish a total product liability premium and total product
liability loss amount for each three-digit industry code. These data
are available for both bodily injury coverage and property damage
coverage, and separate variables have been created for each of these
components of liability costs.13 We divide the aggregate premium
and loss data by three-digit industry sales data from the Census of
Manufactures.
12
We focus on insurance data for bodily injury and property damage claims using
the entire ISO file of insurance premium rates and claims data for product liability
coverage. The number of claims and valid records is substantial. For example, in 1980
there were over 20,242 claims involving bodily injury for which there are data on the
loss levels.
13 The recent escalation in liability costs throughout the United States has primarily
occurred for the bodily injury component (see Viscusi 1991b).
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Although these data represent by far the most extensive information pertaining to liability costs, they do not reflect all liability expenses. Firms that self-insure or obtain coverage through a company
not affiliated with the ISO will not be represented in this sample. The
data consequently provide a partial assessment of the total costs of
liability to American industry and can best be regarded as an index
of the relative distribution of liability costs across industries, as opposed to a measure of the absolute level of the liability burden.'4
The liability costs of a product risk to a firm generally consist of the
premium costs, the legal fees, and the uninsured costs that may be
imposed. Since the ISO data pertain only to premiums and losses,
excluding uncovered costs, our measures should be viewed as a proxy
for the full liability burden.'5
A policy written in any given year covers a 2-year period. In setting
premium levels, the insurance adjuster relies on the manual rate for
the product group and information about the firm's own loss history,
as well as adjustments for the firm's current product mix. Premiums
consequently are a measure of historical product risk levels and expected risk levels for the current product mix.
The second insurance measure represents losses experienced under a particular policy. Whereas premiums capture expected costs,
losses reflect the liability costs actually incurred. These losses in turn
will influence future premiums through the experience rating procedure. Losses are charged back to the initial policy year, so that a loss
on a product sold in 1980 but for which the losses were incurred in
1983 will appear in the data as a loss in 1980.
For recent policy years (e.g., 1984), all claims that will ultimately
be filed on policies written in that year are not yet known. However,
these loss and claim levels can be projected using standard actuarial
techniques. We have done this using the loss and claim projection
factors developed by ISO.
Sample Characteristics
Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for the variables
used in the PIMS/ISO sample. The R & D variables indicate substantial heterogeneity with respect to R & D activities. Product R & D
as a percentage of sales (product R & D/sales) equals about 1.5 percent, with a standard error about 50 percent higher than the mean.

"4 For additional discussion of this data set, see Viscusi (1991 b) and Viscusi and
Moore (1991a, 1991c).
15 If total costs are proportional to total premiums or total losses, then our two
measures of insurance will have captured the full liability cost, up to a positive scale
factor. This is clearly a best-case assumption that is unlikely to hold.
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Twenty-one percent of the firms in the PIMS sample do no product
R & D, whereas in some cases R & D equals 10 percent of sales.
The R & D capital variable measuring whether firms benefit substantially from product patents indicates that about one in every five
members of our sample benefits substantially from past R & D efforts.
This does not account for firms that have unpatented trade secrets,
however, so that these numbers probably understate the extent of
the success of the firm's R & D projects. The general level of innovative activity at the industry level is captured by the binary technological change variable, which indicates that 27 percent of the firms operate in markets characterized by substantial technological change.
The final R & D variables measure the importance of new products
as a component of the firm's sales in the current period. Forty-seven
percent of the firms sell some new products, with some firms reporting up to 70 percent of their sales due to new products. Overall,
the average contribution of new products to sales is not great.
The product liability cost measures indicate that bodily injury accident costs are greater than property damage losses. The premium
measures exceed the loss measures because underwriting costs and
allowance for normal industry profits create a spread between premiums and losses.
IV.

Empirical Hypotheses

As indicated above, the empirical analysis focuses on product R & D
intensity as the measure of current innovative activity by the firm.'6
The basic estimating equation is
product R & D intensity

=

Io
+
+
+
+

+ P3product patents
,B2technological change
N3recent entryit
I34recentexitit + ylliabilityit
Py2liability2+ Eit-

(4)

Time-varying variables are indicated by the t subscript, and i indexes
the line of business.
The variable indicating whether the business benefits to a significant degree from product patents captures the role of historical levels
of product innovation, or R & D capital, on R & D intensity as well
as the influence of R & D capital on actual business performance.'7
16
See Cohen and Levin (1989) for a survey of the literature on the determinants of
R & D intensity.
17 Clark and Griliches (1984) use a similar formulation. The results in Levin et al.
(1987) suggest that this variable is an imperfect indicator of R & D capital. However,
its significance argues for its inclusion as a control variable, particularly since the
interpretation of its effect is of secondary importance.
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The measure of the importance of technological change to the industry captures industry-specific characteristics of technological change.
The next set of hypotheses pertains to the relationship between
innovation expenditures and industry growth. Firms in growing and
developing industries typically are in situations in which new product
development is likely. We analyze a series of variables pertaining to
the industry's growth performance, such as recent entry into the industry and exit from the industry. The entry variable should have a
positive effect on innovation (P3 > 0), and the exit variable should
have a negative effect (14 < 0).
The first set of liability influences that we explore pertains to the
effect of product liability costs on R & D intensity. In the case of
safety-related innovation expenditures, one would expect higher liability levels to increase the incentive to invest in safety improvements.
Beyond some threshold, liability costs will depress innovation, since
the firm will produce inherently risk-free products or withdraw the
product. With respect to safety innovation expenditures, therefore,
we expect a positive effect at low liability cost levels, which would
eventually be dominated by a negative relationship between liability
costs and innovation at higher cost levels. In the case of product
novelty innovations, we expect higher liability costs to have a negative
effect on such innovations through all levels of liability burdens unless
they are safety-enhancing. A positive influence of liability on innovation (-Yl+ 2-y21iability> 0) indicates a dominant safety effect, whereas
a negative influence (-Yl+ 2-y21iability< 0) reflects a dominant product innovation discouragement effect. In each case, we expect a negative effect of liability on innovation at high levels of liability (Y2 < 0).
V.

Empirical Results on R & D Intensity

The measures of innovative activity available in the PIMS data can
be distinguished according to whether they represent the long-run
levels of innovation (i.e., the product patent and technological change
variables), current inputs into the innovation process (i.e., the product
and process R & D intensity variables), or the current outputs of
R & D (i.e., the new product variable). The hypotheses developed in
Section IV described a number of expected influences on the R & D
intensity variable, which reflects current R & D input decisions.
Our analysis considers four distinct measures of the expected product liability cost: premiums for bodily injury and for property damage
relative to sales, and losses for bodily injury and for property damage
relative to sales. The premium variables constitute more economically
meaningful measures of the liability costs faced by firms. Most of the
growth in liability costs in the 1980s related to bodily injuries.
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Table 2 presents ordinary least squares regressions of the product
R & D intensity variable-product R & D relative to sales-on industry, firm, and liability cost variables.'8 We include observations with
zero R & D intensity here and explore the sensitivity of our results
to this treatment in the next section. The liability cost variables-in
this case, bodily injury premiums and losses relative to sales, property
damage premiums and losses relative to sales, and their squaresshow strong and consistent effects. In both the bodily injury and
property damage regressions, liability costs/sales increase product
R & D intensity at low risk levels. The nonlinearity of this effect is
exhibited by the coefficient on the squared liability cost/sales variable,
which is negative and significant (at the .05 confidence level) in two
of four cases. Furthermore, the liability variables are always jointly
significant.
It appears that at very low liability cost levels, firms have incentives
to invest in product safety research in order to reduce these costs, yet
still introduce the product to the market. This is the safety incentive
effect. When the liability cost levels become sufficiently large, the net
effect is negative. This pattern may reflect a product withdrawal effect on safety innovation or a dominant negative influence of the
adverse effects of liability on product novelty at high levels of liability.
In terms of the model above, -Yl> 0 and Y2 < 0.
The magnitudes of the liability effects on product R & D intensity
are meaningful in a practical sense as well. For example, with the
coefficient estimates from the regression of product R & D intensity
on bodily injury losses reported in column 1 of table 2, if liability
costs fell from their mean of 0.6 percent to zero, there would be
a reduction in product R & D intensity of 0.19, which represents
approximately 12 percent of total R & D intensity. This linear extrap-

18 We also estimated fixed and random effect versions of our model, controlling for
first-order autoregression in the residuals. Because of the unbalanced nature of the
PIMS sample, with many of the firms included in only one or two years, and the nature
of the risk variable, which changes slowly over time within three-digit industries, we
did not expect these techniques to yield precise results. This was borne out in the
estimates. We thus rely on the cross-section estimates with time and industry dummies
since they are more robust and remain unbiased in the presence of random effects
and autocorrelation. The liability variables should be exogenous since they are predetermined. The average lag between the date of an injury and the date of claim closure
is 1.5 years. There is an additional lag between the time of product sale and the date
of injury. These lags make it unlikely that current R & D could affect recorded losses
and premiums. We tested for the potential endogeneity of the liability cost variables
using the Hausman (1978) specification test. Instrumental variables included all the
explanatory variables, two-digit industry dummies, and the legal environment variables
considered by Viscusi (1990) in his study of the determinants of product liability risk.
Test results indicate that the least-squares estimates do not differ significantly from
their two-stage counterparts.
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olation, although tenuous, indicates the practical importance of the
liability effects.'9
The equations in table 2 are otherwise consistent with the literature.
The industry variables in table 2 indicate more R & D in healthy
industries in which there is increased competition and in industries
with technological change, as expected.
The strength of the liability cost effect should differ between process and product R & D. Process R & D focuses mainly on changes
in the way that goods are manufactured and as a result relates primarily to the manufacturing defect doctrine. In contrast, product R & D
and product-related patents relate more to design defects. Most legal
scholars attribute the increased liability burden over the past three
decades to the expansion of the design defect doctrine rather than
to the role of manufacturing defects. Moreover, design defects pose
the most substantial risks for a firm, since the firm will face liability
for the entire product line rather than for the small percentage of
the products that are subject to a manufacturing defect. As a result,
for the R & D intensity equations, we expect a much stronger influence of liability on product-related innovation than on processrelated innovation.
Table 3 presents estimates of process R & D intensity regressions
that explore this hypothesis. As expected, the effects of product liability costs are not as pronounced here. Only the equation that uses
property damage premiums as the liability measure yields significant
effects, with a positive value of yl and a negative value of Y2.
Refinementsand Sensitivity Tests
Two alternative econometric specifications are suggested by our
model, which emphasized the importance of corner solutions, and by
our data, which indicate that a substantial portion of firms in the
PIMS sample report no expenditures on R & D. To incorporate these
features, we estimated a Tobit model. Following Bound et al. (1984),
we also estimated a selectivity-corrected model for firms reporting
some R & D expenditures. As noted by Bound et al., a substantial
portion of firms in their National Bureau of Economic Research sample report no R & D whatsoever. Whether this result indicates a corner solution or merely nonreporting of positive expenditures is not
clear. They provide some evidence that R & D reporting depends on
19The effect of a change in the bodily injuryloss/salesratio of - 0.006 would be to
change product R & D intensity according to the formula A(R&D/S)= [33.9 - 2 x
280.0(PLIS)]A(LIS).Evaluated at the midpoint of the interval [0, 0.006], this effect
equals (33.9 - 1.7)(-0.006), or 0.19.
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R & D intensity, which is the dependent variable that we use in our
regressions. Thus the potential for selectivity bias exists.
Results for alternative estimations indicate that the basic result is
very robust.20 Significant and positive coefficients are found for each
liability measure for both the Tobit and selectivity-corrected models.
The magnitudes of the main effects, which are almost uniformly
larger than the least-squares estimates, are as expected.21
Another robustness test pertains to the dependent variable used.
The results in table 2 indicate that product liability costs alter product
R & D intensity, which presumably affects innovation outputs. A
more direct measure of the effect of liability costs on new product
development can be derived from an analysis of the new products
variable. The results, summarized in table 4, mirror the earlier findings, with three important extensions. First, the percentage new product Tobit regressions include the R & D intensity variable as a regressor, so that the cost variables capture the effect on innovation
given R & D intensity. Second, the new product variable measures the
effects of the liability cost on innovation output rather than indirectly
through the R & D intensity variable. Third, the nonlinearities are
more precisely estimated here, since the quadratic risk term is negative and significant in all eight possible cases. Product liability cost
increases innovation at low liability cost levels and decreases it beyond
a threshold.
VI.

Implications

It is possible to use the preceding results to compute the R & Dmaximizing risk levels and to determine which industries in the sample lie beyond these points. For each of these industries, an important
implication of our results is that the same level of R & D intensity
could be generated by lower product liability cost, because of the
quadratic nature of the R & D-liability cost relationship. If the composition of R & D is the same at these two different levels of liability
cost, then there may be an efficiency loss. To determine more gener20

These results are presented in detail in Viscusi and Moore (1991 b).
Furthermore, the quadratic terms are once again negative and usually significant,
indicating that the product withdrawal effect is also quite robust. The selectivitycorrected results also indicate systematic unobservable differences between zero and
nonzero R & D firms. In particular, the coefficient of the mean of the truncated
distribution of the error term, X, in the positive R & D intensity equation is significantly
different from zero in all four cases. This result is consistent with the findings of
Bound et al. (1984). We also find that inclusion of the selectivity bias term has a
substantial effect on the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients, which are double
their values in table 2, on average. The net effect of liability costs remains unchanged,
however, once the nonlinearities are accounted for.
21
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ally whether liability costs should rise or fall requires a case-by-case
assessment of the benefits associated with increased product availability, balanced by increases in health losses associated with the existence
of dangerous products.
For the bodily injury premium regressions reported in table 2, the
risk level corresponding to the peak R & D level occurs at a premium/
sales ratio of about 5 percent.22 Similar magnitudes result for the
bodily injury loss variable. The maximum level of R & D generated
by bodily injury losses occurs at a ratio of bodily injury losses to sales
of approximately 6 percent. For the property damage liability effects,
which are smaller in magnitude relative to sales, the maximum R & D
effects occur at levels of 2 percent for property damage losses and 3
percent for property damage premiums.
On the basis of the ordinary least squares equations in table 2, there
are 11 industry groups beyond the point at which liability costs exert
a negative effect on innovation.23 Although some of these industries
may lie beyond the turning point simply because of sampling error
in the estimated cost coefficients, the product mix is consistent with
our expectations. The industry with the highest liability cost-SIC
code 266-is the composition goods industry, which includes manufacturers of asbestos insulation and other fibrous materials. The ratio
of bodily injury losses to sales of 14 percent in this industry far exceeds that in any of the other industries in our sample. Asbestos
litigation now constitutes over one-half of all litigation in federal
courts.
There is also a high liability cost in the miscellaneous chemical
products industry, SIC code 289. This industry produces, among
other things, battery acid, fireworks, jet fuel igniters, and pyrotechnic
ammunition, all of which are quite risky and associated with high
liability levels.
Also at or near the turning point for one or more of the liability
variables are the rubber product industry, whose products include
tires, a highly litigated product; pottery and related products, which
produces bathroom fixtures and cooking ware; miscellaneous fabricated metal products, the industry in which safety valves of various
types are produced; the metalworking machinery industry, in which
22 The effect of bodily injury premiums/sales (BIP/S) on R
& D intensity (R&D/S) is
a(R&D/S)/a(BIP/S) = 34.1 - [2 x 337.4 X (BIP/S)]. Equating this expression to zero
and solving for BIP/S yield the ratio BIP/S = 0.05.
23 Earlier results reported in Viscusi and Moore (1991c) indicated that a small number of manufacturing industries were above the point beyond which increases in product liability reduce R & D expenditures. These included the machine bolt and screw
industries, construction, and some service industries. The results reported here add a
number of auxiliary control variables and include only manufacturing firms.
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products such as hand-held power tools, metal-cutting machine tools,
and welding equipment are produced; the special machinery industry, in which sawmill machines, band saws, and food slicers are produced; electrical industrial apparatus; laboratory apparatus; and miscellaneous manufacturing. Of particular note is the miscellaneous
manufacturing industry, whose products include book matches,
which have been the subject of product safety regulation, and cigar
and cigarette lighters, which are heavily litigated.
VII.

Conclusions

The empirical relationship between product liability cost and research
and development on new products suggests systematic linkages consistent with previous evidence on specific products such as vaccines.
Product liability costs increase product R & D intensity initially, but
the effect eventually becomes negative. Several manufacturing industries are located beyond the point at which R & D intensity is maximized. For these products, the same R & D level could be achieved
for a lower product liability burden. However, this conclusion focuses
only on average industry effects, not the composition of the R & D
or the potential desirability of the withdrawal of some specific risky
products.
It is not possible with our data to distinguish the effects of product
liability on safety-related R & D expenditures and on the development of new varieties of the product. It is clear, however, that net
expenditures on product R & D relative to sales rise with increases
in product liability costs up to some level and that the portion of sales
due to new products is similarly affected. We infer from these results
that the development of new, safer products is the primary outcome
engendered by the recent growth in the cost of product liability to
firms. Whether these safety improvements represent efficiency gains
depends on the underlying liability doctrines and their application by
the courts.
The product liability-innovation relationship is much stronger for
product R & D than for process R & D. This coincides with the
prevailing view that expansion of the design defect doctrine, rather
than the manufacturing defect doctrine, has contributed to the increased role of product liability. These results also suggest that our
estimates are capturing the role of liability costs rather than some
other aspect of product quality.
Although the findings presented here do not indicate the overall
desirability of changes in legal rules, they do highlight clear-cut effects that may enhance or hinder overall social welfare. Perhaps even
more important, they identify a strong relationship between liability
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and innovation that has made the courts a major player in the product
innovation process.
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